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Partial Revision of the Cartel Act: Swiss Federal Council Presents Draft Law

<h3>Swiss Federal Council Publishes Preliminary Draft</h3>
<h3>Background</h3>
On November 24, 2021, the Federal Council approved a preliminary draft for the partial revision of the Cartel Act (Draft-CartA) and opened public consultation. This marks a new attempt to revise the Cartel Act (CartA) following the failed revision of 2012. The planned revision contains four central points, which are presented below.
<h3>I. Re-introduction of the effects control for hardcore anticompetitive agreements</h3>
With the Swiss Federal Supreme Court&#8217;s judgment in the Gaba case (BGE 143 II 297 of June 28, 2016), the long-standing practice of the Competition Commission (ComCo) on anticompetitive agreements pursuant to Article 5 CartA was changed respectively tightened. According to this judgment, agreements under Article 5(3) and (4) CartA (hardcore horizontal and vertical agreements) do in principle fulfill the significance test. Therefore, since this decision it has generally no longer been necessary to examine whether such agreements actually affect competition, i.e. whether they have been implemented and what their effects on competition are.
As a reaction to the Gaba judgment, the parliamentary motion Français requested the Swiss Federal Council in December 2018 to amend Article 5 CartA and to stipulate that both qualitative and quantitative criteria must be taken into account when determining whether an agreement is unlawful. Article 5(1bis) Draft-CartA provides for the effects control called for by the motion Français: In addition to qualitative criteria, quantitative criteria must also be taken into account when assessing the significance of hardcore anticompetitive agreements.
The per se significance of certain agreements introduced by the Gaba judgment has led to legal uncertainty for companies, for example in the case of cooperation agreements or joint ventures. A clarification of Article 5 CartA, according to which qualitative and quantitative criteria are to be taken into account, would prevent such agreements from being considered as in principle fulfilling the significance test and thus – subject to the efficiency justification, which in practice is difficult to prove – potentially sanctionable conduct. The implementation of the parliamentary motion Français thus gives companies more leeway for competitively desirable behavior, but raises fears on the part of the Federal Council of declining competitive pressure and rising prices.
<h3>II. Merger Control</h3>
A. Limitation of the Notification Obligation
According to the Draft-CartA, the notification requirement is to be waived in the event of international mergers that are assessed by the European Commission, if all relevant geographic markets include Switzerland and at least the European Economic Area (EEA) (Article 9(1bis) Draft-CartA).
The companies concerned are thereby exempted from having to notify the merger in parallel to the European Commission and ComCo in cases where only markets covering at least Switzerland and the EEA are involved. This is likely to bring some relief in terms of resources. However, the savings should not be overestimated: Already today, notification in Switzerland in such cases is regularly based on the filing with the EU Commission. In addition, it can be expected that the definition of the relevant geographic market may give rise to discussions and that a merger would still have to be notified to ComCo in case of doubt.
B. Reduction of the Intervention Threshold in Mergers
1. Baseline
With the Draft-CartA, a new attempt is being made to introduce the so-called SIEC test (significant impediment to effective competition). Since the introduction of this test in European Union competition law in 2004, there has been discussion in Switzerland about harmonizing the legislation.
Under current law, the qualified market dominance test (dominance plus) applies. This means that ComCo can only prohibit a merger or approve it subject to remedies if the merger creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition can be eliminated (Article 10(2) KG).
2. Intervention Criteria of the SIEC Test
With the introduction of the SIEC test, ComCo can intervene in mergers if they (i) significantly impede effective competition and (ii) do not lead to efficiency gains for consumers demonstrated by the companies concerned and that would compensate for the disadvantages of the significant impediment to competition (Article 10(2) Draft-CartA). In contrast to the dominance test, the SIEC test allows for an intervention in particular in the case of unilateral (non-coordinated) effects below the threshold for single market dominance. Unilateral effects arise when a merger in an oligopoly market does not create dominance but reduces the competitive pressure exerted in the market. Conceptually, the SIEC test is intended to prevent welfare losses (e.g. price increases for differentiated products) in cases of mergers between close competitors in oligopolistic markets.
3. Efficiency Defense
According to the Draft-CartA and similar to EU merger control law, any efficiency gains to be considered in the efficiency defense must benefit consumers. However, a dynamic understanding of consumer welfare, i.e. one that is to be optimized in the long term, is adopted (Article 10(2)(b) Draft-CartA). The Swiss legislature has so far refrained from pursuing distributive goals in favor of consumers with competition law (see Article 5(2) CartA, which does not require consumer participation, as opposed to Article 101(3) TFEU). Alternatively, a total welfare standard could be introduced, which would allow for a somewhat more comprehensive consideration of efficiency gains – or even of sustainability benefits.
4. Lower Intervention Thresholds
According to the Draft-CartA, the referral thresholds in merger control remain unchanged. Consequently, the number of notifications will not increase with the introduction of the SIEC test. In contrast, lower intervention threshold and hence more examination procedures (Phase II) can be expected:
First, the requirement of possibility of elimination of competition no longer applies, which is likely to make some mergers more difficult. Second, intervention is also possible in the case of unilateral effects below the threshold of (individual) market dominance (so-called gap cases). Whether this will actually lead to more interventions remains to be seen. First of all, the WEKO has interpreted the concept of collective dominance under current law broadly. Moreover, it remains to be seen what requirements will be imposed in practice to prove that effective competition is significantly impeded. A look at the practice in EU competition law shows this: Following increasingly interventionist application of the SIEC test by the European Commission, recent case law has put the brakes on this practice and imposes higher requirements for intervention (see judgment of the European General Court T-399/16 in CK Telecoms UK Investments v. European Commission of May 28, 2020, appeal pending before the ECJ).
5. Impact on Companies
Following the introduction of the SIEC test, economic analyses would likely be used more frequently, in particular, to determine competitive proximity as a factor in unilateral effects analysis. This is likely to increase the complexity of Phase II proceedings and have a cost-driving effect. The Draft-CartA provides for an extension of the review periods in merger control proceedings with the consent of the reporting companies, indicating that longer proceedings may be expected in the future.
However, it is largely in the hands of ComCo how extensively it will apply the SIEC test and what information requirements it will develop in practice. The flexibility of the test in this respect is reflected, for example, in the fact that the effort required for merger control proceedings before the European Commission has steadily increased (e.g., comprehensive information requests and lengthy pre-notification procedures), whereas in Germany the additional information effort has so far been rather moderate following the introduction of the SIEC test. If the SIEC test was introduced in Switzerland, a certain degree of legal uncertainty for companies can be expected in an initial phase due to the lack of established decisional practice.
<h3>III. Changes in the Civil Enforcement of Competition Law</h3>
Another central objective of the partial revision of the CartA is the strengthening of civil enforcement of competition law, which has so far only been of minor importance in Switzerland. The most significant changes in this respect are presented below.
A. Extension of the Consumer&#8217;s Right of Action
Currently, according to the prevailing view, due to the wording of Article 12 CartA, end customers and thus in particular consumers are not entitled to assert civil claims in the event of an unlawful restriction of competition. This may lead to a liability gap: A company that restricts competition may be able to defend itself against claims for damages from other companies by arguing that the latter have not suffered any damage because they were able to pass on the price which was overpaid due to the unlawful restriction of competition to the downstream market level – ultimately to consumers (passing-on defense). For their part, these end customers cannot assert claims for damages for lack of a right of action.
The Federal Council proposes to extend the possibility of civil action, which is currently limited to competitors, to all those affected in their economic interests by restrictions of competition (Article 12 Draft-CartA). As a result, end customers (including, e.g., public contracting authorities) will also be able to assert their rights in civil proceedings in the future.
Companies must prepare for the possibility that there might be more competition civil claims. It remains to be seen how many consumers will ultimately file a lawsuit, especially if low amounts are in dispute. In this regard, the main variable will be whether claims might increasingly be asserted collectively, e.g. by consumer protection organizations.
B. Suspension of the Statute of Limitations during Administrative Proceedings
Claims arising from unlawful restraints of competition are subject to the relative limitation period of 3 years under tort law pursuant to Article 60 of the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO). In the future, the statute of limitations for claims arising from unlawful restraints of competition is therefore to be suspended from the opening of an investigation by ComCo until the final decision is rendered (Article 12a(1) Draft-CartA). Pursuant to Article 134(2) CO, the statute of limitations would subsequently begin or continue to run. This is intended to alleviate the problem that injured parties in civil proceedings are forced to submit their civil action at an early stage.
In essence, this amendment corresponds to the legal situation in the EU (see Article 10(4) of the Antitrust Damages Directive 2014/104/EU).
C. Civil Compensatory Payments will Reduce Administrative Sanctions
Article 49a is supplemented in the Draft-CartA by a new paragraph 5 about the consideration of damages payments in the assessment of sanctions. This relates to cases in which a company sanctioned by ComCo in administrative proceedings voluntarily (i.e. without being obliged to do so by a civil court) pays damages, reparations or disgorges profits at a later date. In this case, the company can request ComCo or the appeal instance to reduce the administrative sanctions appropriately by filing a request for revision.
As a result, any civil compensatory payments subsequently and voluntarily made by the companies involved to aggrieved parties will be taken into account when assessing administrative sanctions. Companies may thus have an incentive to settle with aggrieved parties in civil proceedings at an early stage. This is also in line with the recent decisional practice of ComCo, which takes into account voluntary payments made as part of a settlement with the injured party when assessing sanctions (Construction Services Graubünden).
<h3>IV. Changes in Administrative Procedural Law</h3>
A. Notification Proceedings
Pursuant to Article 49a(3)(a) CartA, a company may notify ComCo in advance of planned conduct that could be qualified as an unlawful restriction of competition. Under the current law, the reported conduct may not be sanctioned unless ComCo opens proceedings against the company within five months. The purpose of the procedure is to enable companies to obtain an assessment from ComCo within a reasonable period of time as to whether a practice could be subject to sanctions.
This procedure is now to be transferred to Article 49a(4) Draft-CartA and to be adapted in two aspects. First, the period within which the ComCo must take action is to be reduced to two months. Second, in the future, only the opening of a formal investigation pursuant to Article 27 CartA and not, as is currently the case, the opening of a simple preliminary investigation pursuant to Article 26 CartA will cause the risk of sanctions to reemerge.
From the company&#8217;s point of view, the question arises whether these adjustments are sufficient to materially increase the attractiveness of these proceedings. For companies, the most important factor is the overall time period within which the proceedings can be concluded, e.g. by means of a safe harbor provision. For companies, it is also not very attractive if the risk of sanctions remerges when an investigation is opened. A company will therefore have to consider whether to make extensive investments in a project if it must expect to risk sanctions again for several years as a result of the opening of an investigation.
B. Introduction of Time Limits and Reimbursement of Representation Costs
The motion tabled by Fournier tasks the Swiss Federal Council, first, with simplifying and accelerating court proceedings under competition law. Second, it calls for the parties&#8217; representation costs in administrative competition proceedings to be reimbursed:
The Draft-CartA provides for the introduction of time limits in investigation procedures according to the principle of comply or explain (Article 44a Draft-CartA). The respective time limits are 30 months for ComCo, 18 months for the Federal Administrative Court and 12 months for the Federal Supreme Court. This means that it should no longer take more than 5 years from the opening of an investigation until a legally binding decision of the court of last instance.
The effect of the statutory time limits is likely to remain limited in practice. Even without formal time limits in the CartA, the principle of accelerated procedure already applies today.
Next, it is proposed to introduce reimbursement of representation costs in first instance cartel administrative proceedings (Article 53b Draft-CartA). If an investigation is – in whole or in part – discontinued, the parties&#8217; representation costs can be reimbursed. Article 53b Draft-CartA is a lex specialis to Article 64 Swiss Civil Procedure Code (CPC), according to which, as a rule, no reimbursement of representation costs is owed in first instance administrative proceedings.
In practice, administrative competition proceedings before ComCo are often laborious and complex. The planned reimbursement of representation will in practice lead to considerable relief for companies that are affected by an investigation that is discontinued or if ComCo&#8217;s decision is revoked.
<h3>Next steps</h3>
The formal consultation period will last until March 11, 2022. Subsequently, the Federal Council is expected to publish the draft law with its dispatch. The revised CartA is not expected to enter into force until 2023 at the earliest.

Partial Revision of the Cartel Act

Context
Switzerland has traditionally been open to foreign direct investment and does not yet have formal mechanism for the systematic review of foreign investment projects (investment control).
Conversely, investment control regimes are common internationally. For example, 18 Member States of the European Union have notified the European Commission that a screening mechanism exists in their national jurisdictions. Most major economies – including all G7 member states – also have investment control regimes in place. Legislation evolves dynamically and generally towards a tightening of investment controls. Increasingly, investment control mechanisms also cover critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, cybersecurity, aerospace, defense, energy storage, quantum and nuclear technologies, as well as nano- and biotechnology.
Against this background, investment control also entered the political agenda in Switzerland. The parliamentary motion Rieder (18.3021) demands that the Federal Council create the legal basis for a control of foreign direct investment in Swiss companies and establish an approval authority for this purpose. Despite the Federal Council&#8217;s assessment that Switzerland&#8217;s liberal policy in the area of direct investment has proven its worth and contributes to securing jobs and know-how in Switzerland, both the Council of States and the National Council approved the parliamentary motion Rieder in June 2019 and March 2020, respectively.
On August 25, 2021, the Federal Council presented the key points of its proposal for Swiss investment control.
Cornerstones of Swiss Investment Control
(i) Objective
Rules in the area of investment control shall be targeted, efficient and administratively lean, without impeding economically desirable direct investments. From the perspective of the economic entities concerned, the rules shall be non-discriminatory, transparent and proportionate, thus ensuring legal certainty.
According to the Federal Council, two objectives shall be pursued with investment control:
<ul>
<li>Protect the public order and security against threats or endangerment entailed in acquisitions of Swiss companies by foreign investors;</li>
<li>Prevent substantial distortions of competition by acquisitions of foreign state or state-related investors.</li>
</ul>
The objectives hence go beyond the mere protection of public security in that investment control shall also protect effective competition. The Federal Council is thus not limiting itself to a minimal proposal, but aims at enforcing the guarantee of economic freedom including the competitive neutrality of state actors against foreign state actors as well.
(ii) Notification requirements
In implementation of the double objective, investment control shall encompass two groups of cases: First, the Federal Council provides for a sector-specific review, aiming at protecting public order and security. Second, in case of takeovers by states or state-related investors, a sector-independent review is envisaged to prevent any distortions of competition.
The sector-specific review shall apply in the event of threats or endangerment to public order or security. For the Federal Council, the following alternative circumstances are to be considered:
<ul>
<li>A company with a service that cannot be dispensed with and cannot be replaced in the short term will fail;</li>
<li>Critical dependencies
<ul>
<li>of the Swiss Armed Forces from suppliers of critical armament components;</li>
<li>of state authorities from suppliers of central security-relevant IT systems;</li>
<li>of international space infrastructures with Swiss participation from suppliers of critical components.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Access by a malicious actor to a large amount of particularly sensitive personal data.</li>
</ul>
A threat to public order and security shall be considered if (i) a sector is affected that is subject to the notification and approval requirement and (ii) one of the above-mentioned threats exists. The Federal Council has so far left open what industries are to be covered by investment control. However, it is partly clear from the criteria outlined above what sectors will be subject to investment control. For example, the security and defense sectors are likely to be covered. In particular, acquisitions of companies in the security-related technology and industrial base (STIB) that provide components for critical operational systems of the Swiss Armed Forces may raise public order and security concerns. Secondly, activities in the aerospace sector, for example, are potentially relevant to security. By way of example, the acquisition of a company that supplies key components for international space infrastructures with Swiss participation, e.g. within the framework of the Galileo program, would be covered by investment control. The blanket clause concerning services that cannot be dispensed with or replaced in the short term will have to be defined in more detail. For example, critical infrastructures or the supply of essential goods could be encompassed by this category.
The concept envisaged by the Federal Council differs from that of German investment control, where the threat to public order and security is generally examined irrespective of the sector concerned (sections 55-59 of the German Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance). The definition of the sectors concerned will be of decisive importance in the legislative process. First, it will determine whether investment control in Switzerland will have a broad or narrow scope. Secondly, a clear definition of the industries is crucial to avoid legal uncertainty among the potentially affected companies.
The sector-independent review is to be applied to takeovers by state-owned or state-related foreign investors. However, the examination of the existence of «substantial» distortions of competition would be challenging in practice, so that at least the definition of de minimis rules is recommended in the further legislative process. In addition, there is an inherent risk of politicization of the procedure, since the involvement of foreign state actors is likely to give rise to fears of an outflow of knowledge and technology to a foreign power.
(iii) Notification Thresholds
The Federal Council proposes that foreign direct investment should only be subject to a notification requirement if it involves the acquisition of control over a domestic company. Under merger control law, an enterprise acquires control over a previously independent enterprise if it «obtains the possibility, through the acquisition of participation rights or otherwise, of exercising a determining influence over the activities of another enterprise.» (Article 4 para. 3 let. b Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition [CartA] in conjunction with Art. 1 Ordinance on the Control of Concentrations of Undertakings [MCO]). With the requirement of acquisition of control, the threshold for notification is set at a high level compared to other countries, where notification obligations regularly exist for shareholdings of 10% or 20%.
On the other hand, there is apparently no turnover threshold for the notification obligation. Unlike in merger control law, where the domestic target company must generally achieve a turnover in Switzerland of CHF 100 million, in investment control the notification obligation would apply regardless of the size of the target company. The Federal Council has left open how the term «domestic company» is to be defined. As part of the consultation process, it is to be determined whether Swiss subsidiaries of foreign groups should be considered domestic target companies or not.
(iv) Review Procedure 
According to the Federal Council, the review procedure should include two stages. In a short Phase I, it would be examined whether an in-depth approval procedure is required or not. If there are no concerns that the acquisition will endanger public order and security, the acquisition can be completed. In Phase II, with a longer deadline, a more in-depth examination takes place.
The Federal Council proposes to entrust the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) with the implementation and coordination of investment control. The procedure provides for a consultation with other Federal offices. In case of disagreement between the offices involved or in case of consensus to prohibit the acquisition, an escalation to the Federal Council would take place. This means that only the Federal Council would have the competence to order a non-approval. It follows from the principle of proportionality that, in addition to approval and non-approval, the possibility must also be open to grant approval subject to conditions.
The two-stage procedure seems appropriate and has proven its worth in merger control law. The Federal Council does not yet specify any timelines for Phases I and II of the investment control procedure. A coordination with the timelines under merger control law (1 month for Phase I and up to 4 months for Phase II) would be expedient in order not to delay merger projects unduly.
As far as can be seen, there is no right of appeal in the event of non-approval by the Federal Council. This means that political aspects will play their role in proceedings. The refusal of the right of appeal seems difficult to justify against the background of Article 6 para. 1 ECHR. The discussion about a «Lex Syngenta» or «Lex China» shows the danger of politicization of investment control. The granting of a right of appeal therefore seems worth examining not only from the point of view of fundamental rights, but also with regard to the realization of the intended legislative objectives.
Next Steps and Relevance for Practice
The Federal Council has defined the cornerstones of the Swiss investment control with due restraint. The proposal mentions a manageable number of risks that could give rise to concerns that a foreign direct investment could endanger public security and order or distort competition due to the involvement of foreign states. However, the planned legislation also creates considerable legal uncertainties for foreign investments, as it operates with undefined legal terms and will require a detailed case-by-case examination for many investment projects in order to clarify the existence of a notification obligation.
The Federal Council&#8217;s proposal for public consultation will be submitted in March 2022. After the consultation procedure, the deliberations in the Swiss Parliament are scheduled, so that the enactment of the Swiss investment control legislation is not expected before 2023. It is not yet possible to estimate whether the Federal Council&#8217;s bill will be able to gain majority support and what changes it will undergo.
If Switzerland were to introduce investment control, foreign investors would in future have to take into account not only merger control, but also investment control law risks; according to the Federal Council&#8217;s proposal, this would be irrespective of the size of the companies involved in the concentration. How many concentrations will actually be subject to scrutiny depends on the specific legal formulation of the control criteria, but also on the definition of a domestic target company. If Swiss investment control is introduced, companies must expect a period of legal uncertainty, at least until a decisional practice of competent authorities has been established. It can be assumed that any investment control will also contain civil and criminal sanctions in the event of infringements of the investment control legislation.

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Swiss Investment Control: Federal Council Defines Principles

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On July 13, 2023, Homburger received the «Impact Deal of the Year» award at the LMG Life Sciences Awards EMEA 2023 for its work on <a href="https://www.homburger.ch/en/news/homburger-advises-csl-with-respect-to-its-announced-public-tender-offer-to-acquire-vifor-pharma">CSL/Vifor</a>. Our team was led by partners Dieter Gericke and Daniel Häusermann. It also included members from our Tax, Financing and Investment Products, Competition and Regulatory, IP / IT, Corporate/M&amp;A, and Employment and Executive Compensation teams.
The awards aim to recognize complex and impactful work across an array of legal specialisms that operate within the life sciences industry.

Homburger honored with LMG Life Sciences EMEA award for «Impact Deal of the Year»

On December 14, 2021, CSL Limited, a global biotechnology company based in Australia (ASX: CSL), and Vifor Pharma AG, a Swiss-based global pharmaceutical company, announced that they had entered into an agreement for CSL to launch an all-cash public tender offer to acquire all publicly held shares in Vifor for USD 179.25 per share, for an aggregate equity value for Vifor of USD 11.7 bn. Vifor&#8217;s board of directors unanimously recommends the offer. Vifor&#8217;s largest shareholder, Patinex AG, holding 23,2%, has agreed to tender its shares into the offer.
Homburger AG is advising CSL Limited on the transaction. The Homburger team is led by partners Dieter Gericke and Daniel Häusermann (Corporate / M&amp;A) and comprises counsel Micha Fankhauser (Corporate / M&amp;A), partners Reto Heuberger and Stefan Oesterhelt (both Tax), Benjamin Leisinger (Financing and Investment Products), Richard Stäuber (Competition, Regulatory), Andri Hess and Luca Dal Molin (both IP / IT), associates Olivier Bühlmann, Francesco Bernasconi and Estelle Piccard (all Corporate / M&amp;A), David Thomann (Competition, Regulatory), Sandrine Chabbey (Financing and Investment Products), Marco Bächtold (Employment &amp; Executive Compensation), Philippe Gobet (Tax), as well as junior associates Adrian Bühlmann, Cédric Berger, Tanja Niederer, Joel Schmidt and Lars Schöni.

Homburger advises CSL with respect to its announced public tender offer to acquire Vifor Pharma 

Aryzta

On March 12, 2021, ARYZTA AG (SWX: ARYN) announced that it has signed a definitive agreement to sell its North American business to Lindsay Goldberg LLC for a total enterprise value of USD 850 m.
The transaction is expected to complete by the end of ARYZTA’s current 2021 financial year and is subject to closing conditions customary for this type of transaction.
Homburger acted as Swiss counsel to ARYZTA in connection with the transaction. The Homburger team was led by partner Claude Lambert and comprised partner Andreas Müller and associates Marc Hanslin and Margrit Marti (all Corporate / M&amp;A), associate David Thomann (Competition, Regulatory) as well as junior associate Géraldine Danuser (Corporate / M&amp;A).

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Homburger honored with LMG Life Sciences EMEA award for «Impact Deal of the Year»

Homburger advises CSL with respect to its announced public tender offer to acquire Vifor Pharma

Homburger advises ARYZTA AG on disposal of its North American business to Lindsay Goldberg LLC

Partial Revision of the Cartel Act: Swiss Federal Council Presents Draft Law

Partial Revision of the Cartel Act

Swiss Investment Control: Federal Council Defines Principles

Teilrevision des Schweizer Kartellgesetzes - Der bundesrätliche Entwurf im Kaleidoskop kartellrechtlicher Prinzipien

Kommentierungen von Art. 86, 87a und 87b BV

Public Procurement & Government Contracts: Switzerland 2023

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Homburger honored with LMG Life Sciences EMEA award for «Impact Deal of the Year»

Homburger advises CSL with respect to its announced public tender offer to acquire Vifor Pharma

Homburger advises ARYZTA AG on disposal of its North American business to Lindsay Goldberg LLC

Partial Revision of the Cartel Act: Swiss Federal Council Presents Draft Law

Partial Revision of the Cartel Act

Swiss Investment Control: Federal Council Defines Principles

Teilrevision des Schweizer Kartellgesetzes - Der bundesrätliche Entwurf im Kaleidoskop kartellrechtlicher Prinzipien

Kommentierungen von Art. 86, 87a und 87b BV

Public Procurement & Government Contracts: Switzerland 2023

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David
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